How can we distinguish one mind from another? How are we to determine what unifies the mind? Given radical mental disunity, these questions need to be answered.

This book presents a theory about the kind of thing a mind is and, on the basis of this theory, a view about how minds are individuated and when two mental states belong to the same mind.

An account of a language in terms of the sense and reference of its sentences is inadequate and must be supplemented by indicating the point of uttering different sentences. Assuming that a sense and reference account will be given in terms of 'truth' conditions, The article shows that such an account is framed in terms of the notion: member of the class of sentences a language user attempts to utter, Rather than the notion of truth, And that one such account (...) can suffice for two languages. To specify a language completely, We must, In addition to a sense-Reference account, Specify which class of sentences language users attempt to utter. (shrink)

D. H. M. Brooks; III*—Dogs and Slaves: Genetics, Exploitation and Morality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 31–6.

Secondary qualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictional qualities. Secondary qualities are a subset of these.